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J. S. GARMON et al., Respondents, v. SAN DIEGO BUILD-
ING TRADES COUNCIL et al., Appellants. 
[1] Labor-Federal Boards--Jurisdiction.-The National Labor 
Relations Board has exclusive primary jurisdiction to prevent 
unlawful demands by labor organization on employer engaged 
in interstate commerce. 
[2a, 2b] Id.-Picketing.-Where the purpose of picketing and 
other economic pressure was to compel a company to sign an 
agreement which included a clause requiring the employer to 
encourage membership in certain unions, this was an "unfair 
labor practice" under the Labor Management Relations Act. 
(29 u.s.c. § 158.) 
[3] Id.-Federal Boards--Jurisdiction.-The National Labor Re-
lations Board need not accept every controversy of which it 
has jurisdiction; it hears and determines controversies only 
in connection with enterprises whose operations have, or at 
which labor disputes would have, a pronounced impact on 
the flow of interstate commerce. 
[4] !d.-Remedies--Jurisdiction of State Courts.-The reason for 
prohibiting state courts from acting in cases in which the 
National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction is to obtain 
uniform application of the substantive rules as expressed by 
Congress, and to avoid diversities and conflicts likely to result 
from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor 
controversies. 
[5] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-A remedy un-
der federal laws available to an injured party may justify 
preemption of the field of labor relations, but when the appli-
cation of that rule would result in the loss of all protection 
there is no reason to bar state courts from providing relief. 
[6] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-There is no 
conflict of jurisdiction between the National Labor Relations 
Board and state courts when the board determines not to 
adjudicate the issues arising from a labor dispute. 
[7] !d.-Remedies--Jurisdiction of State Courts.-The National 
Labor Relations Board's refusal to accept jurisdiction of a 
[1] See Am.Jur., Labor, § 145. 
[2] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), Labor, § 35 et seq.; 
Am.Jur., Labor, § 223 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 9] Labor, § 1a; [2] Labor, § 23, 
[ 4-8, 10, 11] Labor, § 24; [12] Labor, § 28.5; [13] Labor, § 20a; 
[14] Labor,§ 30.5; [15] Labor, § 28. 
658 GARMON v. SAN DIEGO BLDG. TRADES CouNCIL [ 45 0.2d 
labor dispute on the ground that the issue presented does not 
sufficiently affect the national welfare to justify the board's 
attention is, in effect, a declaration that the national labor 
policy will not be jeopardized if the state assumes jurisdiction. 
[8] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-By giving the 
National Labor Relations Board discretion to accept or refuse 
jurisdiction of a controversy the legislative purpose must 
have been to give the state courts jurisdiction when the board 
specifically determines that the controversy will not affect 
the national economy. 
[9] !d.-Federal Boards-Jurisdiction.-The general policy of the 
National Labor Relations Board in regard to controversies of 
which it will take jurisdiction makes no distinction between 
an application to determine representation and one complain-
ing of an unfair labor practice, and a refusal to take juris-
diction of a controversy concerning representation constitutes 
a refusal to accept jurisdiction of a complaint against that 
employer which charges an unfair labor practice. 
[10] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-The Taft-
Hartley Act,§ lO(a) [29 U.S.C. 160(a)], giving the National 
Labor Relations Board the power to prevent any person from 
engaging in an unfair labor practice when it affects inter-
state commerce, also empowers the board, by agreement, to 
cede jurisdiction of cases affecting such commerce to state 
agencies so long as the state law is not inconsistent with the 
national labor policy as expressed in the federal laws, but 
Congress has not prohibited the state from assuming jurisdic-
tion of conduct which would amount to an unfair labor practice 
under the federal law when the board refuses to take juris-
diction. 
[11] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-The basis for 
refusing to allow a state court to take jurisdiction of a dispute 
within the cognizance of the National Labor Relations Board 
in advance of action by it is the purpose to avoid a possible 
conflict between state policy and that of the board in an area 
in which the federal body has not had opportunity to act. 
[12] Id.-Remedies-Findings.-In an action against unions to 
enjoin picketing and recover damages, findings that the unions 
presented a labor agreement to the employer company with 
a demand for its signature, followed by picketing and other 
activity with the purpose to compel the employer to execute 
the agreement although it would be illegal to do so, was a 
determination against the unions on their defense that there 
was no unfair labor practice because the contract was not 
to be signed, and if signed, would not be accepted by the 
union unless the employees became members of it. 




purpose of picketing was not to induce the employees to 
join the unions but was to compel the employer company to 
sign the labor agreement or suffer destruction of 
its business will not be disturbed on appeal where there is 
ample evidence to support it. 
[15] Id.-Remedies-Evidence.-In an action against unions to 
enjoin picketing and to recover damages, an award of $1,000 
damages against the unions is sustained by testimony that 
the employer, as a result of the picketing, was required to 
pick up and deliver its products at different yards, incurring 
the expense of additional man hours and trucking facilities, 
and that at least one prospective purchaser was induced to 
purchase materials at another yard because of the union 
activities, resulting in the loss of profits at least as great as 
the amount of damages awarded. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County. ,Tohn A. Hewicker, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action against unions to enjoin picketing and to recover 
damages. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed. 
Todd & Todd, Thomas Whelan, John T. Holt and Clarence 
E. Todd for Appellants. 
Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye, James W. Archer and Ward W. 
Waddell, Jr., for Respondents. 
EDMONDS, J.-The Garmons, while engaged in business as 
partners under the name of Valley Lumber Company, became 
involved in a dispute with union labor organizations. The 
appeal is from a judgment which enjoins the unions and their 
members from carrying on certain activities and awards dam-
ages in the amount of $1,000 against them. 
Following a trial, the court made these findings of fact : 
Valley Lumber Company is engaged in the business of sell 
ing lumber and building materials, and its operations affect 
interstate commerce. In the previous year it sold materials 
originating and manufactured out of California of a value 
exceeding $250,000. None of its employees belong to any of 
the defendant unions and none have designated either of them 
as a labor representative. The employees have indicated that 
they do not desire to join, or be represented by, a union. The 
National Labor Relations Board has not certified either of the 
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unions &'l the representative of the and the company 
has not recognized any union as such. 
The union demanded a labor agreement containing a clause 
which would require the company to employ, and continue in 
employment, only such persons as are, or immediately become, 
members of the defendant unions. 1 The company refused to 
execute the agreement, upon the grounds that it would be a 
violation of the National Labor Relations Act to do so before 
the employees, or an appropriate unit thereof, designated a 
union as its collective bargaining agent. Shortly thereafter, 
the unions placed pickets at the company's place of business. 
The intent of the unions was not to induce the employees 
to join one of them, nor to provide education or information as 
to the benefits of unionization. The only purpose was to force 
the company to execute the agreement or suffer destruction of 
its business. In addition to picketing, union agents followed 
the company's trucks and threatened persons about to enter its 
place of business with economic injury. By this conduct, and 
the use of language calculated to instill fear of such injury, the 
unions induced building contractors to discontinue their 
patronage of the company, with consequent damage to the 
business amounting to $1,000. 
The National Labor Relations Board, " ... pursuant to a 
policy declared by it, refused to take jurisdiction of the contro-
versy between plaintiffs and defendants for the purpose of 
determining whether defendants should be designated as the 
collective bargaining representative of the employees of 
plaintiffs. '' 
Upon these findings a judgment was entered which awards 
the company $1,000 damages and enjoins the unions " ... 
from picketing the places of business of plaintiffs, from fol-
lowing the trucks of the plaintiffs, from preventing or attempt-
ing to prevent, by means of threats, express or implied, persons 
having business with the plaintiffs from entering the premises 
of the plaintiffs, from inducing or attempting to induce by 
such means potential customers of plaintiffs to refuse to pur-
ehase from plaintiffs or to refuse to accept delivery of goods 
1
"Pursuant to the terms of Section S(a) (3) of the Labor Manage· 
ment Relations Act, 1947, there shall be no limitation of the Employer 
as to whom he shall employ, continue in employment, or discharge, except 
that every employee listed under Section III, (A) and (B), hereof, not 
otherwise excluded, shall be, or shall make application within thirty (30) 
!lays, become and remain a member in good standing of Millmen's Union, 
r,ocal 2020, of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of 
America, or Building Material and Dump Truck Drivers, Local 36.'' 
Dec.1955] GARMON v. SAN Drnao BLDG. TRADES CouNCIL 661 
[45 C.2d 657; 291 P.2d 11 
from plaintiffs or in plaintiffs' trucks, and from doing any 
other acts tending or intended to injure plaintiffs' business, in 
order to compel plaintiffs to execute any contract with the 
defendants, or any of them, requiring plaintiffs to discriminate 
with respect to conditions of employment by reason of mem-
bership, or lack thereof, in any labor organization unless and 
until defendants, or any one or more of them, have been 
properly designated as the collective bargaining representative 
of plaintiffs' employees or an appropriate unit thereof." 
The unions contend that jurisdiction of the controversy is 
exclusively in the National r_,abor Relations Board. They also 
attack the judgment upon the ground that the company did 
not exhaust its administrative remedies. Other points pre-
sented are: the evidence does not support the findings; the find-
ings do not include all issues tendered; the award of damages 
is based upon evidence entirely speculative; and, the record 
shows no violation of any state law. 
In support of the judgment, the company asserts that the 
jurisdiction of the national board is not exclusive, or if it is, 
the state court may enjoin unlawful conduct when the board 
has declined to act. Another point relied upon is that, regard-
less of state jurisdiction to enjoin the unions, the superior 
court's award of damages for violation of the state's public 
policy is not contrary to any federal law. 
[1] The National Labor Relations Board has exclusive 
primary jurisdiction to prevent unlawful demands. (Weber 
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 [75 S.Ct. 480, 99 
L.Ed. 546] ; Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers 
Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 [74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 
228]; United Const. Workers v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 347 
U.S. 656 [74 S.Ct. 833, 98 L.Ed. 1025] ; Bethlehem Steel v. 
New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767, 769 [67 
S.Ct. 1026. 91 L.Ed. 1234].) [2a] The purpose of the picket-
ing was to compel the company to sign an agreement which 
included a clause requiring the employer to encourage mem-
bership in the unions. In the circumstances here shown, under 
the Labor Management Relations Act, this was an unfair labor 
practice.2 
1 (a) "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ••• 
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any 
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership 
in any labor organization. . . '' 
(b) "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization 
or its agents ..• (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to 
discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) 
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In the Garner case, a Pennsylvania court enjoined 
which, contrary to a state statute, was on for the 
purpose of coercing an employer to or ''influence'· 
employees to join the union. The state Supreme Court reversed 
the judgment upon the ground that the sole remed~ 
was that provided by the National Labor ]',l[anagement Rela-
tions Act. (Garner v. Teamsters, 373 Pa. 19 [ 94 A.2d 893]. · 
The United States Supreme Court agreed, holding "that peti-
tioner's grievance fell within the jurisdiction of the National 
I.1abor Relations Board to prevent unfair labor practices .... '· 
[3] However, the board need not accept every controversy 
of which it has jurisdiction. (Haleston Drug Stores v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, 187 F.2d 418. See discussion by 
Philip Feldblum, Jurisdictional "Tidelands" in I.Jabor Rela-
tions, 3 Labor Law Journal 114.) It hears and determines 
controversies only in connection with ''enterprises whose op-
erations have, or at which labor disputes would have, a pro-
nounced impact upon the flow of interstate commerce." (Na-
tional Board Press release dated October 6, 1950.) 
In the present case, the employer's position is that, when 
the National Labor Relations Board refuses to take jurisdic-
tion of a dispute because the effect of the company's business 
on interstate commerce is not substantial, the state courts may 
act. The United States Supreme Court has not decided this 
question. In the Garner case it pointed to the lack of any indi-
cation that "the federal Board would decline to exercise its 
powers once its jurisdiction was invoked." (Garner v. Team-
sters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 TJ.S. 485 
[74 S.Ct. 161 at 164, 98 L.Ed. 228] .) Later in Building 
Trades Council v. J[inm·d Const. Co., 346 U.S. 933 [74 S.Ct. 
373, 98 L.Ed 423], in reversing a state court's affirmance of an 
injunction on the authority of the Garner case, it said: ''Since 
there has been no clear showing that respondent has applied to 
the National Labor Relations Board for appropriate relief, or 
that it would be futile to do so, the Court does not pass upon 
the question suggested by the opinion below of whether the 
state court could grant its own relief should the Board decline 
to exercise its jurisdiction.'' 
[ 4] The reason for prohibiting state courts from acting in 
cases in which the board has jurisdiction is to obtain uniform 
or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership 
in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground 
other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees 
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining member-
ship .... " (29 U.S.C. § 158.) 
GARMON v. SA~ Dmoo BLDG. TRADES CouNCIL 663 
[45 C.2d 657; 291 P.2d 11 
--------~------~ 
of the substantive rules as by Congress, 
and to avoid diversities and conflicts likely to result from a 
variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor contro-
n~rsies. (Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local 
L'nion No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 [74 S.Ct. 161, 166, 98 L.Ed. 228].) 
[5] A remedy under federal laws available to an injured 
party may justify preemption of the field of labor relations, 
but when the application of that rule would result in the loss of 
all protection, there is no reason to bar state courts from pro-
viding relief. [6] There is no conflict of jurisdiction when 
the federal board determines not to adjudicate the issues. 
[7] Furthermore, a refusal to accept jurisdiction upon the 
ground that the issue presented does not sufficiently affect the 
national welfare to justify the board's attention, in effect, is a 
declaration that the national labor policy will not be jeopard-
ized if the state assumes jurisdiction. 
[8] When Congress enacted the applicable statutes, it 
must have been aware that an unfair labor practice may affect 
management and labor in a small business to the same extent 
as in a large industry. The difference is only the effect on the 
national labor and economic level. Certainly Congress did not 
intend to deprive a business having only a limited effect on 
interstate commerce of all protection in a labor-management 
controversy. By giving the board discretion to accept or 
refuse jurisdiction, the legislative purpose must have been 
to give the state courts jurisdiction when the board specifically 
determines that the controversy will not affect the national 
economy. (Accord: Your Food Stores v. Retail Clerks' Local 
No. 1564, 124 F.Supp. 697, 703; Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, W. 
& Helpers Local No. 941 v. Whitfield Transportation, Inc., 
-Tex. - [273 S.W.2d 857, 860]; but cf.: New York 
State Labor Relations Board v. Wags Transp. System, 130 
N.Y.S.2d 731; Universal Oar & Service Co. v. International 
Assn. of Machinists, 27 C.C.H. Labor Law Reporter 68, 825.) 
In the present case, the employer filed a petition for 
determination of representation, pursuant to the provisions 
of the National I1abor Relations Act. It was informed by let-
ter that ''The amount of business done by Valley Lumber 
Company in interstate commerce is insufficient for the Board 
to assert jurisdiction on the basis of previous Board decisions." 
I1ater, after a careful investigation, the regional director of 
the board dismissed the petition. He stated that "in view of the 
scope of the business operation involved, it would not effectu-
ate the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act to insti-
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tute further proceedings at this time .... " It appears with-
out conflict that only $250,000 of the company's business dur-
ing the preceding year was in interstate commerce, either di-
rectly or indirectly. In view of the general pronouncement 
by the board (Press Releases dated October 6, 1950 and July 
14, 1954) that it will exercise jurisdiction only when an "enter-
prise" has a direct inflow of material valued at $500,000 a 
year, or an indirect flow valued at $1,000,000, a request for 
review of the Regional Director's action would have been 
futile. 
[9] The general policy of the board in regard to jurisdic-
tion makes no distinction between an application to determine 
representation and one complaining of an unfair labor prac-
tice. A refusal to take jurisdiction of a controversy con-
cerning representation constitutes a refusal to accept juris-
diction of a complaint against that employer which charges an 
unfair labor practice. In C. A. Braukman, etc. and Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers, 94 N.L.R.B. 234, the 
board said, ''True, the Board has not heretofore considered 
the instant complaint case. However, because the Board does 
not, with respect to the question of jurisdiction, differentiate 
between representation and complaint cases, we believe that 
dismissal of the . . . representation case on jurisdictional 
grounds ... was in effect, notice to all parties concerned that 
any complaint case based on alleged unfair labor practices ... 
would similarly be dismissed." (Also see: National Labor 
Relations Board v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141.) 
[10] Section 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act (29 U.S.C. 
§ 160 (a) ) , gives the board the power to prevent any person 
from engaging in an unfair labor practice when it affects inter-
state commerce. That section also empowers the board, by 
agreement, to cede jurisdiction of cases affecting such com-
merce to state agencies so long as the state law is not incon-
sistent with the national labor policy as expresesd in the fed-
eral laws. But Congress has not prohibited the state from 
assuming jurisdiction of conduct which would amount to 
an unfair labor practice under the federal law when the board 
refuses to take jurisdiction. When jurisdiction is declined by 
the board, the legislative mandate that nothing shall affect the 
board's power to enforce the act is not infringed upon. 
[11] The basis for refusing to allow a state court to take 
jurisdiction of a dispute within the cognizance of the board 
in advance of action by it is the purpose to avoid a possible 
conflict between state policy and that of the board in an 
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area in which the federal body has not had an opportunity 
to act. "Coincidence" of policy, the United States Supreme 
Court has declared, is not sufficient to avoid the danger of 
a possible conflict. (Bethlehem Steel v. New York State Labor 
Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767, 769 [67 S.Ct. 1026, 91 L.Ed. 
1234].) However, if the state court should refuse to assume 
jurisdiction when the board has affirmatively declined to act, 
one party to the labor controversy might be able to flout the 
policy expressed by Congress in the national legislation. 
[12] The unions complain of the court's asserted failure 
to make a finding on their allegation that there was no unfair 
labor practice beeause, as clearly stated, the contract was 
not to be signed, and if signed, would not be accepted by the 
union unless the employees became members of it. But the 
findings that the unions presented the agreement to the com-
pany with a demand for its signature, followed by picketing 
and other activity with the purpose to compel the employer 
to execute the agreement although it would be illegal to do 
so, was a determination against the unions upon this defense. 
The company argues that the trial court properly gave 
both damages and injunctive relief. It relies upon the rule 
stated in James v. JJiarinship Corp., 25 CaL2d 721 [155 P.2d 
329, 160 A.L.R. 900], that "the object of concerted labor 
activity must be proper and that it must be sought by lawful 
means, otherwise the persons injured may obtain damages 
or injunctive relief." (P.728) They assert that damages 
were a proper redress for the injuries previously suffered 
from the picketing and concerted activities by defendants 
and an injunction is proper to avoid further injury. The 
appellants take the position that "the conduct of the labor 
union was lawful and proper in the light of both federal and 
state law." 
[13] One argument is that since the ultimate objective of 
the concerted economic pressure was to obtain a closed shop, 
which is a proper labor objective under the law of California 
(McKay v. Retail Auto Salesmen's Local Union No. 1067, 
16 Cal.2d 311, 327 [106 P.2d 373] ; Shafer v. Registered Phar-
macists Union Local 1172, 16 Cal.2d 379, 387-388 [106 P.2d 
403] ) , the purpose of the picketing was not ''unlawful'' and 
hence not within the rule of the Marinship case. For this 
proposition, reliance is placed upon Park & Tilford I. Corp. 
v. International etc. of Teamsters, 27 Ca1.2d 599 [165 P.2d 
891, 162 .A.L.R. 1426). 
The Park & Tilford case concerned an injunction which, 
a majority of the court concluded, was broader than that 
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allowed by the pleadings and the evidence. There, without 
having obtained the requisite majority of employees for the 
purposes of collective bargaining, a labor organization pick-
eted and boycotted the employer after demanding of him 
that he sign a closed shop agreement with that organization. 
An injunction was granted restraining the union from all 
interference with the sale or delivery of the plaintiff's prod-
ucts and from all picketing and boycotting of its business. 
This relief was too broad, said a majority of the court, al-
though the trial judge was correct in the conclusion that the 
demands made by thr; union were unlawful under the National 
Labor Relations Act. 
The evidence as to the union's conduct, said the court, 
did not support the finding that the purpose of the concerted 
economic pressure was to compel the employer to violate the 
federal law by discriminating as to his employee's choice of 
union representation. Instead, it was held, the ultimate 
purpose of the economic pressure was to bring about a closed 
shop agreement, which would be lawful under both California 
law and the controlling federal statutes. The court further 
held that, although the federal act made unlawful the em-
ployer's signing of such an agreement before a requisite 
majority of his employees was obtained by the union, the 
statute did not proscribe the assertion of economic pressure 
by the unions upon both hi.m and his employees, to compel 
their accession to union demands, before the time at which 
the employer might lawfully comply with them. This con-
struction of the federal act was based, in part, upon an 
analogy made to the Shafer and McKay cases, snpra, in which 
quite similar provisions in sections 921-923 of the California 
I..~abor Code were construed as protecting employees from 
improper employer influence but not as protecting the em-
ployer from economic pressure designed to bring about a 
closed shop agreement. 
Since those decisions, however, the federal statute has been 
broadened to extend protection to the employer from such 
activities. (29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (2).) [2b] The assertion 
of economic pressure to compel an employer to sign the type 
of agreement here involved is an unfair labor practice under 
section 8 (b) (2) of the act. ( Cf. Great Atlantic &; Pacific 
Tea Co. (1949) 81 N.L.R.B. 1052.) Concerted labor activities 
for such a purpose thus were unlawful under the federal 
statute, and for that reason were not privileged under the 
California law. ( Cf. Park &; Tilford I. Corp. v. International 
etc. of Teamsters, 27 Cal.2d 599, 604 [165 P.2d 891, 162 
Dec.] CouNCIL 667 
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[14] however, that the purpose of the con-
certed activities here complained of was to invite the em-
ployees to the union. But the court found that the 
purpose of the was not to induce the employees 
to join the unions but to compel the company to sign the 
proffered or suffer destruction of its business. 
To hold that a contrary was intended would require 
this court to draw different inferences from thr evidrnce 
which amply supports the finding of the trial court. 
[15] Finally, it is argued that the evidence does not 
support the finding as to the amount of damages. However, 
there is testimony that the employer, as a result of the picket-
ing, was required to pick up and deliver its products at 
different yards, incurring the expense of additional man 
hours and trucking faeilitiPs. The record also shows that at 
least one prospective purchaser was induced to purchase ma-
terials at another yard because of the union activities, result-
ing in the loss of profits at least as great as the amount of 
damages awarded. This evidence amply supports the judg-
ment insofar as damages are concerned. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, .T., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
In this ease defendant unions were enjoined from peaceful 
picketing to organize plaintiffs' employees, have them join 
defendants and have def<'mlants as their bargaining repre-
sentatives; damages were also awarded to plaintiffs for the 
picketing. The trial court found that plaintiffs' business 
affected interstate commerce. Plaintiffs requested the Na-
tional r_.abor Relations Board to hold an election to determinr 
who should represent their employees. The board dismissed 
the proceeding-. The majority opinion holds that the ease 
is one in which the board would normally have jurisdiction 
and the state court would not, because defendants' activity 
was an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Man-
agement Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.)* but, says 
*That is clearly the law. (Weber v. Anhenser·Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 
468 [75 S.Ct. 480, 99 L.Ed. 5461; Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs. 
<f Helpers Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 [74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228]; 
United Canst. Workers v. Laburnum Canst. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 [74 S.Ct. 
833, 98 L.Ed. 1025]; Build·ing Trades Council v. Kinard Comt. Co., 346 
U.S. 933 [74 S.Ct. 373. 98 L.Ed. 4231.) 
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the majority, in this case the state court has be-
cause the board refused to take by the 
representation proceedings and that federal law (Labor Man-
agement Relations Act) rather than state law is applicable ; 
that under the federal law defendants' conduct an unfair 
labor practice, the picketing was for an unlawful purpose. 
Hence defendants were and damages 
awarded against them. In other the state court is 
to enforce the federal law. 
Those conclusions are fallacious for the following reasons : 
( 1) The national board and the powers to it are 
an integral part of the federal law and that law is not intended 
to have application in a situation where the board plays no 
part; it is inescapable that the federal law is to be admin-
istered by the board, not by the state courts. (2) The board 
in refusing jurisdiction as it has power to do, has in effect 
determined that the federal law should not apply in this case. 
(3) It is neither feasible nor fair to apply the federal law. 
( 4) There has not been such a refusal to exercise jurisdiction 
by the board here as to justify the conclusion that the state 
court has jurisdiction. 
Before discussing those points it should be observed that 
under our law defendants' activity is lawful and hence neither 
damages nor injunctive relief is proper. The majority does 
not question this proposition. The rule was stated with the 
citation of many supporting authorities in Park & Tilford 
I. Corp. v. International etc. of Teamsters, 27 Cal.2d 599, 604 
[165 P.2d 891, 162 A.L.R. 1426] : "The closed shop is recog-
nized as a proper objective of concerted labor activities, even 
when undertaken by a union that represents none of the 
employees of the employer against whom the activities are 
directed. (McKay v. Retail etc. Union No. 1067, 16 Cal.2d 
311, 319, 322 [106 P.2d 373] ; Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists 
Union, 16 Cal.2d 379, 382 [106 P.2d 403] ; C. S. Smith Met. 
,7J,Iarket Co. v. Lyons, 16 Cal.2d 389 [106 P.2d 414] ; Sontag 
Chain Stores Co. v. Superior Conrt, 18 Cal.2d 92 [113 P.2d 
689] ; see Fortcnbury v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.2d 405 [106 
P.2d 411] ; Steiner v. Long Beach Local No. 128, 19 Cal.2d 
676, 682 [123 P.2d 20]; Emde v. San Joaquin Cmtnty etc. 
Council, 23 Cal.2d 146, 155 [143 P.2d 20, 150 A.L.R. 916] ; 
Lisse v. Local Union, 2 Cal.2d 312 [ 41 P.2d 314] ; In re Lyons, 
27 Cal.App.2d 293 [81 P.2d 190]; J. F. Parkinson Co. v. 
Building Trades Cottncil, 154 Cal. 581 [98 P. 1027, 16 Ann. 
Cas. 1165, 21 L.R.A.N.S. 550] ; Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 
156 Cal. 70 [103 P. 324].) ... A union may picket and 
Dec.1955] GARMON v. SAN DIEGO BLDG. TRADES CouNCIL 669 
[45 C.2d 657; 291 P.2d 11 
boycott an employer's business with the object of so dis-
couraging public support of the business that the nonunion 
workers will face the prospect of the loss of their jobs. . . • 
"Picketing and boycotting unquestionably entail a hardship 
for an employer when they affect his business adversely. The 
adverse effect upon the employer's business that may result 
from the competition among workers for jobs is comparable 
to the adverse effect on his business that may result from his 
own competition with other employers. It is one of the risks 
of business. (See C. S. Smith Met. Market Co. v. Lyons, 
16 Cal.2d 389, 398 [106 P.2d 414].) 'The law ... permits 
workers to organize and use their combined power in the 
market, thus restoring, it is thought, the equality of bargain-
ing power upon which the benefits of competition and free 
enterprise rest. Accordingly, the propriety of the object of 
workers' concerted activity does not depend upon a judicial 
determination of its fairness as between workers and employ-
ers.' ( 4 Rest. Torts, p. 118.) . . . 
"[I]n Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, supra, the 
eourt stated: 'The argument is ... made that it is absurd 
to suppose that these provisions were written with the inten-
tion of restraining the employer from influencing his em-
ployee, while at the same time conferring upon other indi-
viduals the right "to coerce" the same employee through the 
employer. But the right of workmen to organize for the pur-
pose of bargaining collectively would be effectually thwarted 
if each individual had the absolute right to remain "unor-
ganized,'' and using the term adopted by the appellants to 
designate the economic pressure applied against them through 
the employer, coercion may include compulsion brought about 
entirely by moral force. Certainly such compulsion is not 
made contrary to public policy by any statute of this state 
!lnd is a proper exercise of labor's rights. (Senn v. Tile 
Layers' Union, 301 U.S. 468 [57 S.Ct. 857, 81 L.Ed. 1229]; 
Lauf v. E. G. Skinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 [58 S.Ct. 578, 
82 L.Ed. 372]; Fur Workers' Union No. 72 v. Fur Workers' 
Union No. 21238 (1940), 105 F.2d 1, aff'd 308 U.S. 522 [60 
S.Ct. 292, 84 !J.Ed. 443].)" 
Speaking to the first point, it is clear that the national 
board and not a state court is to administer the federal law, 
at least in situations involving unfair labor practices. It is 
the forum which is to decide what steps, if any, should be 
taken to interpret initially the law, to make rules and regu-
lations amplifying the law, to decide what is best for inter-
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state commerce when activity in a labor controversy is claimed 
to interfere with it, to maintain uniformity in the treatment 
of cases, etc. The stated purpose of the federal law is to 
preserve certain rights and protect commerce (29 U.S.C.A. 
0 151.) The national board is created and it must report 
to Congress on the cases it has heard. (I d., § 153.) It may 
make rules and regulations to carry out the act. (Id., § 156.) 
Unfair labor practices arc defined. (I d., § 158.) The board 
·'shall decide'' ''. . whether, in order to insure to em-
ployees the full benefit of their right to self-organization 
;:nd to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the 
policies of sections 151-166 of this the unit appropriate 
for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer 
unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof. 
'' (c) ·whenever a question affecting commerce arises con-
cerning the representation of employees, the Board may in-
vestigate such controversy and certify to the parties, in writ-
ing, the name or names of the representatives that have been 
designated or selected." (I d., § 159.) The board " ... is 
empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person 
from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 
158 of this title) affecting commerce. This power shall not 
be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention 
that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or 
otherwise : Provided, That the Board is empowered by agree-
ment with any agency of any State or Territory to cede to 
such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other 
than mining, manufacturing, communications, and transporta-
tion except where predominantly local in character) even 
though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting com-
merce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial statute 
applicable to the determination of such cases by such agency 
is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this sub-
chapter." (I d., § 160.) If it is charged that an unfair labor 
practice is being committed the board "may" issue a com-
plaint and shall deeide the matter; it "may" ask a federal 
court for equitable relief in enforcing its decision, and its 
decision may be reviewed by a federal court. (Id., § 160.) 
Immunity from prosecution is accorded witnesses who are 
compelled to testify before the board. (Id., § 161.) These 
and many other provisions elearly envision that the federal 
law is not to operate without the national board. That propo-
sition was pointed out in Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
& Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 [74 S.Ct. 
161, 98 L.Ed. 228 J : "Congress has taken in hand this par-
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ticular type of controversy where it affects interstate com-
merce. . . . [I] t has forbidden labor unions to exert certain 
types of coercion on employees through the medium of the 
employer. It is not necessary or appropriate for us to surmise 
how the National Labor Relations Board might have decided 
this controversy had petitioners presented it to that body. 
The power and duty of primary decision lies with the Board, 
not with us. But it is clear that the Board was vested with 
power to entertain petitioners' gnevance, to issue its own 
complaint against respondents and, pending final hearing, 
to seek from the United States District Court an injunction 
to prevent irreparable injury to petitioners while their case 
was being considered. . . . 
"Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of 
law to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law 
generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary 
interpretation and application of its ntles to a specific and 
specially constitnted tribunal and prescribed a particular pro-
cedure for investigation, compla·int and notice, and hearing 
and decision, including judicial relief pending a final admin-
istrative order. Congress evidently considered that central-
ized administration of specially designed procedures was 
necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive 
rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to 
result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward 
labor controversies. . . . A multiplicity of tribunals and a 
diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incom-
patible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of 
substantive law. The same reasoning which prohibits federal 
courts from intervening in such cases, except by way of review 
or on application of the federal board, precludes state courts 
from doing so. . . . And the reasons for excluding state ad-
ministrative bodies from assuming control of matters expressly 
placed within the competence of the federal board also exclude 
state courts from like action.'' (Emphasis added.) And it 
is said in Textile Workers Union of America v. Arista Mills 
Co., 193 F.2d 529, 533: " 'It is perfectly clear, both from 
the history of the National Labor Relations Act and from 
the decisions rendered thereunder, that the purpose of that 
act was ''to establish a single paramount administrative or 
quasi-judicial authority in connection with the development 
of federal American law regarding collective bargaining"; 
that the only rights made enforceable by the act were those 
determined by the National I1abor Relations Board to exist 
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under the facts of each case; and that the federal trial courts 
were without jurisdiction to redress by injunction or other-
wise the unfair labor practices which it defined.' " It should 
be clear, therefore, that the Labor Management Relations Act 
in dealing with unfair labor practices can only be enforced 
by the intervention of the national board, and that state 
courts are not in a position to apply that law. 
In regard to the second point it is settled that the national 
board may refuse jurisdiction because interstate commerce 
is not sufficiently affected. "Even when the effect of activities 
on interstate commerce is sufficient to enable the Board to 
take jurisdiction of a complaint, the Board sometimes prop-
erly declines to do so, stating that the policies of the Act 
would not be effectuated by its assertion of jurisdiction in 
that case." (Emphasis added; National Labor Relations 
Board v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 
684 [71 S.Ct. 943, 95 L.Ed. 1284] ; see also Haleston Drug 
Stores, Inc. v. National Labor Relahons Board, 187 F.2d 418, 
cert. den., 342 U.S. 815 [72 S.Ct. 29, 96 L.Ed. 616]; National 
Labor Relations Board v. Atlanta Metallic Casket Co., 205 
F.2d 931; National Labor Relations Board v. StoUer, 207 
F.2d 305; National Labor Relations Board v. Guy F. Atkinson 
Co., 195 F.2d 141; note, 98 L.Ed. 221.) That power neces-
sarily includes the power to determine that the federal law 
shall not apply in a particular case. When it refuses to take 
jurisdiction in a particular case because commerce is not 
affected and the "put·poses of the Act will not be effectuated" 
by assertion of jurisdiction it has said that the case is not 
one for the application of the federal law and the state court 
should not override that decision as it has done in this case. 
It is true that the board is given power to cede jurisdiction 
to a state agency by agreement with such agency over any 
cases in any industry even though such cases may involve 
labor disputes affecting interstate commerce tmless, however, 
the state's applicable "statute" is "inconsistent" with the 
federal act. (29 U.S.C.A. § 160(a).) There has been no 
cession here,* but the cession provision indicates that in such 
cases the state is in effect applying federal law because there 
can be no cession unless the federal and state law are con-
sistent in both wording and interpretation. It thus may be 
inferred that the states are to apply the federal law only 
\n the situation where the cession requirements are met. In 
other situations it is to apply its own law. When we come 
*We have neither statute nor agency covering the field. 
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to the power of the federal board to refuse jurisdiction, as 
distinguished from cession, we find that power is to make 
such refu,_<Jal because the board finds or states "that the policies 
of the Act would not be effectuated by" the board's assertion 
of jurisdiction (emphasis added). (See National Labor Re-
lations Board v. Denver Bldg. & Oonst. Trades Council, supra, 
341 U.S. 675, 684; and cases cited 81tpra, together with the 
statement in the decision by the regional director in this 
particular case as to why jurisdiction was refused.) In other 
words, the board has the power under its authority to refuse 
jurisdiction-to decide that the "policies" declared by the 
provisions of the federal act, shall not apply in a particular 
case. The board having made that determination, it follows 
that the state court should not apply the federal act where 
the board has refused to act. Implicit also in the power 
of refusal is the board's conclusion that there is no need 
for uniformity of deeision in order that businesses and labor 
in interstate commerce will be similarly treated. Moreover 
the board having exclusive jurisdiction generally, it also has 
exclusive jurisdiction to determine that interstate commerce 
is not sufficiently affected for the federal law to operate. The 
state court thus has no jurisdiction to decide to the contrary. 
Thirdly, it is neither feasible nor fair to apply the federal 
taw in this case. We have no agency such as a labor relations 
board in this state or anything like it. There are no facilities 
for conducting representation elections to determine whether 
a union shall be the collective bargaining agent for the em-
ployees, a question whieh may be basic in passing upon unfair 
labor practice charges. We have no body with the facilities 
nor expertness in the field. Our courts are at a disadvantage 
in sizing up the national picture-the impact upon interstate 
commerce-in deciding such controversies. The courts cannot 
make rules and regulations on the subject as may the national 
board. They cannot achieve the uniformity that is vital 
nnder the federal law, not having available to them, as does 
the national board, the nationwide circumstances. 
The discrimination which results from the majority holding 
is manifest. An employer, although engaged in business af-
fecting interstate commerce, yet not enough in the board's 
view to justify taking jurisdiction and applying the federal 
law, is essentially a local operator and such business should 
have applied to it the state law the same as its competitors 
whose business is purely intrastate. There is no rational basis 
for discriminating between the two classes of business or the 
45 C.2d-22 
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employees or unions concerned. Neither has any meaningful 
impact on interstate commerce and thus both should be 
amenable to the same law-the state lavv governing intrastate 
commerce-employer-employee-union relations. 
In the foregoing discussion it has been assumed that there 
was a refusal by the national board to take jurisdiction of 
the case and that such refusal is ground for saying the state 
court has jurisdiction. The latter question has not been settled 
by the United States Supreme Court. In Garner v. Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, & Helpers Union No. 776, supra, 346 U.S. 485, 
488, the court held, as above indicated, that the board had 
exclusive jurisdiction but in discussing the question, men-
tioned that "Nor is there any suggestion that respondents' 
plea of federal jurisdiction and pre-emption was frivolous 
and dilatory, or that the federal Board would decline to 
exercise its powers once its jurisdiction was invoked." In 
the later case of Bu1:lding Trades Council v. Kinard Canst. 
Co., supra, 346 U.S. 933, the court reversed (in a memorandum 
opinion) the state court's (Supreme Court of Alabama) af-
firmance of an injunction on the basis of the Garner case 
and in so doing stated : '' Since there has been no clear 
showing that respondent has applied to the National Labor 
Relations Board for appropriate relief, or that it would be 
futile to do so, the Court does not pass upon the question 
suggested by the opinion below of whether the state court 
could grant its own relief should the Board decline to exer-
cise its jurisdiction." It was pointed out in the decision 
by the Alabama Supreme Court (Kinm·d Const. Co. v. Build-
ing Trades Council, S1tpra, [258 Ala. 500] 64 So.2d 400, 402) 
that the board had made the general criteria statement, the 
same as it did here, as to the cases in which it would take 
jurisdiction. I interpret the Kinard case as holding, there-
fore, that such a general pronouncement as that made by 
the board here is not sufficient to show that the board would 
refuse to exercise jurisdiction. We have, therefore, the first 
question as to whether there has been a sufficient showing 
of refusal to exercise jurisdiction in this case, assuming such 
refusal would leave the matter open to state action. It would 
appear that there is not sufficient showing of refusal here. 
Although the regional director mentioned the scope of plain-
tiffs' business, it may well have been that his investigation 
revealed the facts as found by the court, that none of plain-
tiffs' employees desired representation by the unions and 
hence an election would be futile. Also the director said 
that no action would be taken at "tltis time" implying that 
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a change of conditions might bring a different result or that 
the charge of an unfair labor practice, a condition the court 
here fouud to exist, might result in board action. While it 
may have been that because of the smallness of the business 
here involved a representation election would not be ordered 
by the board and for the same reason a complaint for unfair 
labor practices would not be considered, it would appear that 
an effort should be made to have the board take jurisdiction 
of the precise question involved in the state court action. 
rather than the side issue of representation, before it may 
be said the board has refused to assume jurisdiction. That 
precise question is whether there has been an unfair labor 
practice for which a remedy may be obtained. We said in 
In re De Silva, 33 Cal.2d 76, 78 [199 P.2d 6] : "No distinc-
tion may be made here because the National Labor Relations 
Board had denied the company's petition for certification of 
a union representative. By the denial the board did not 
divest itself of jurisdiction to determine whether the defend-
ants were committing unfair labor practices affecting inter-
state commerce which should be enjoined pursuant to the 
procedure provided by the act. Its exclusive jurisdiction over 
that matter had not been invoked by the plaintiffs." 
Furthermore, there is also an insufficiency of a showing 
that the board would not act, in that, as pointed out by the 
regional director, plaintiffs could have appealed the dismissal 
of their representation petition to the national board in Wash-
ington, D. C. This they did not do. The dismissal may 
have been reversed. "There is no doubt that the adminis-
trative remedy is not exhausted where a party fails to appeal 
from an administrative decision to a higher tribunal within 
the administrative machinery, or, having filed an appeal, fails 
to await a determination thereon before his resort to the 
courts.'' ( 42 Am.J ur., Public Administrative Law, § 202; 
see Woodard v. Broadtvay Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 111 Cal. 
App.2d 218 [244 P.2d 467]; 2 Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, 
§ 187.) It is suggested, however, that an appeal would con-
sume an amount of time that would render any remedy from 
the board ineffective, and that the criteria statement of the 
board above quoted indicates an appeal would be futile. 
Neither point has merit. 
The delay is one of tbe incidents of the procedure before 
the board established by Congress to handle certain labor 
controversies. In a situation in which it was held that a 
federal court would not enjoin a state court from giving 
relief in a case under the Labor Management Relations Act 
676 GARMON v. SAN DIEGO BLDG. TRADES CouNCIL [ 45 C.2tl 
--------------------·----·-· 
and the union had to follow the state action through the state 
appellate procedure and then apply to the Supreme Court, 
the court stated in regard to the delay caused by following 
the state appellate procedure, "Misapplication of this Court's 
opinions is not confined to the state courts, nor are delays 
in litigation peculiar to them. To permit the federal co uri;.; 
to interfere, as a matter of judicial notions of policy, may 
add to the number of courts which pass on a controversy 
before the rightful forum for its settlement is established. A 
district court's assertion of equity power or its denial may 
in turn give rise to appellate review on this collateral issue. 
There may also be added an element of federal-state competi-
tion and conflict which may be trusted to be exploited and 
to complicate, not simplify, existing difficulties." (Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers v. Richman Brothers, 348 U.S. 511 
[75 S.Ct. 452, 457, 99 L.Ed. 600] .) 
The statement of criteria is no more reason to declare that 
an appeal to the board would be futile than that it makes 
an application to the regional director unnecessary. The 
same reasons, that is, that there should be a final determina-
tion by the director and board before it can be said the 
board has refused to exercise its jurisdiction, apply to the 
necessity for an appeal. The board as such has not acted 
until an appeal is taken and determined. The essence of 
state jurisdiction if the board refuses to act is an unequivocal 
final determination by the board that it will not act. Indeed, 
the board may on appeal determine that a representation 
election, the only thing asked by plaintiffs, is not appropriate 
because none of their employees belong or desire to join the 
union rather than that the policies of the federal law will 
not be effectuated by taking jurisdiction. As heretofore 
pointed out, the United States Supreme Court has in effect 
held that a general criteria statement is not enough to amount 
to a refusal by the board to take jurisdiction. (Building 
Trades Council v. Kinard Co11st. Co., sttpra, 346 U.S. 933.) 
In the foregoing discussion I have assumed that the ma-
jority adheres to the state law as stated in Park & Tilford I. 
Corp. v. International etc. of Teamsters, quoted supra, 27 
Cal.2d 599, and the many cases there cited, and I trust there 
is no thought of overruling those cases without saying so 
although it applies the federal law by using the ritual of 
unlawful purpose. t However, it is not clearly pointed out 
tPicketing for an unlawful purpose may be enjoined under state law; 
the purpose here is unlawful under the federal law, and hence enjoinable, 
but is lawful under state law and therefore not enjoinable. 
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that under our law the purpose of the picketing here involved 
is not unlawful or that the court is applying the federal law 
only because interstate commerce is affected. 
The judgment should be reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied December 
28, 1955. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were 
of the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22750. In Bank. Dee. 2, 1955.] 
CHARLES H. BENTON, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent, 
v. PAINTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 333 et al., Ap-
pellants. 
[1] Labor-Federal Boards-Jurisd.iction.-Where an employer's 
business affects interstate commerce, in the first instance, 
jurisdiction of its controversy with labor unions vests ex-
elusively in the N a tiona! Labor Relations Board. 
[2] Id.- Federal Boartls- Jurisdiction.-Where an employer's 
petition for a determination of representation was dismissed 
by the N a tiona! Labor Relations Board on the ground that 
the unions named in the petition did not claim to represent 
the unit of employees for which petitioner sought an election, 
this was not a refusal to take jurisdiction, but only a declara-
tion that petitioner was not entitled to an election under the 
provisions of the statute. 
[3] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-A general pro-
nouncement of the National Labor Relations Board that it will 
exercise jurisdiction only in cases in which the employer's 
business in interstate commerce exceeds a certain minimum 
amount is not sufficient automatically to confer jurisdiction 
on a state court where an employer's operations do not come 
up to that minimum. 
[4] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-In an action 
against unions to enjoin picketing and to recover damages, the 
state court has jurisdiction to award damages to the em-
ployer if the evidence shows that it is entitled to them under 
state law. 
[1] See Am.Jur., Labor, § 145. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 8] Labor, § 1a; [3, 4, 6, 7] Labor 
§ 24; [5, 9] Labor,§ 20a; [10] Labor,§ 21. 
